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Abstract
In prediction markets, investors trade assets whose values are contingent on the oc-
currence of future events, like election outcomes. Prediction market prices have been
shown to be consistently accurate forecasts of these outcomes, but we don’t know
why. I formally illustrate an information acquisition explanation. Traders with more
wealth to invest have stronger incentives to acquire information about the outcome,
thus tend to have better forecasts. Moreover, their trades have larger weight in the
market. The interaction implies that a few well-endowed traders can move the asset
price toward the true value. One implication for institutions aggregating information
is to put more weight on votes of agents with larger stakes, which improves on equal
weighting, unless prior distribution accuracy and stakes are negatively related.
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1 Introduction
In a 2003 forecasting tournament, participants predicted outcomes of football games through-
out a season to win prizes. Probability forecasts were rated with a quadratic scoring rule, so
only participants with consistently accurate forecasts would be in the top ranks. Two mock
entrants simply used the prices from two different prediction markets as their forecasts,
and placed 6th and 8th out of almost 2,000 participants (Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004).
More generally, prediction markets have been shown to provide better forecasts than polls
in political elections (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1992; Berg et al., 2008), expert forecasts in sports
(Spann and Skiera, 2009), or sales forecasts in business (Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).
One kind of asset traded in these markets is called winner-take-all (WTA) contract. It
pays out 1 iff a pre-specified condition is fulfilled, otherwise it pays out 0. For example,
the IEM prediction market for the 2012 US Presidential election traded a Democratic and
a Republican contract, which would pay out $1 iff the respective candidate obtained the
majority of popular votes cast for the two major parties. Consequently, the price of a WTA
contract may be interpreted as the market probability estimate that the respective candidate
wins the election. With similar contracts, market-based predictions can be obtained for
virtually all areas beyond politics.
Why do these markets predict so accurately? There are no satisfying explanations so
far. As Berg and Rietz (2006) state, “exactly how prediction markets become efficient is
something of a mystery.” The main goal of this paper is to provide and formally illustrate
a theory. In what I shall call information acquisition explanation, traders have stronger
incentives to acquire information about the unknown outcome the larger their endowment.
Consequently, high endowment traders are better informed. Moreover, high endowment
traders have larger impact on the market price, because they can buy more assets. This in-
teraction implies that few, but well-endowed traders can move the market price—interpreted
as prediction—in the right direction, thereby explaining the observed accuracy. Unlike many
financial market models, the explanation does not rely on the existence of rational expec-
tations, nor on the presence of insiders or the ability of traders to infer information from
asset prices. Even markets with traders who have systematically biased opinions about
the outcomes can produce accurate forecasts, because of effective incentives for information
acquisition and endogenous weighting by investment volume.
In my model, traders start out with an initial opinion about the outcome of the election.
Based on this prior belief, endowment and asset prices, they decide whether to acquire
information, whose accuracy depends on their information acquisition effort. Consequently,
informed traders and noise traders (driven by opinion) evolve endogenously, which explains
partially where beliefs originate and when beliefs (and market forecasts) tend to be accurate.
I establish that traders with prior beliefs close to the ‘market estimate’ (price), or with
high endowment, have the strongest incentive to acquire information. The interpretation
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is that traders with extreme opinions about the outcome do not expect to be swayed by
evidence, and hence do not acquire it, while traders with opinions close to the market price
acquire information, because it might change their investment decision. High endowment
traders have more at stake and are willing to acquire costly information in order to safeguard
their investment. Comparative statics show that the bias of the market price is usually
reduced in response to an endowment increase of all traders, because information acquisition
is supported. It also shows that a shift of prior beliefs toward the true outcome usually
improves forecasts, but may in rare cases increase bias. Numerical examples give an idea
about the effect size of information acquisition and exogenous changes in the parameters.
One lesson for institutional design is that giving more weight to votes or investments of
high endowment agents might improve information aggregation. If accuracy of prior beliefs
and endowment are not negatively related, then high endowment agents tend to have better
information, which can be exploited via weighting. An empirically testable implication
is that forecasts should be better with weighting by stake rather than equal weighting.
Moreover, forecasts should be better if investment per trader is larger in the market.
WTA prediction markets are analytically identical to fixed-odds betting, provided odds
are set competitively. Prediction market prices are translated into odds like probabilities.
For example, if the price of the Democratic contract is pi, and the complement is priced at
1 − pi, then the odds of a Democratic victory are (1 − pi)/pi in the corresponding betting
market (ignoring fees). Thus, the results also apply to betting markets.
While the idea that prediction (or stock) markets provide incentives to search for infor-
mation is not new (e.g., Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; Arrow
et al., 2008), this is the first paper to formalize it in order to explain prediction market
accuracy, and demonstrate its interaction with the endogenous weighting implied by market
clearing. Existing models are designed to address different questions (see next section).
They typically assume an arbitrary belief distribution or give traders informative signals by
default, so that forecast accuracy is a trivial consequence of the accuracy of these primitives.
In contrast, quality of information is endogenous in my model, so it is more suitable to ex-
plain the accuracy or inaccuracy of prediction markets. In a numerical example, the model
with information acquisition has a 10 percentage points smaller forecast bias on average
than a model without information acquisition (e.g., Manski, 2006), holding all exogenous
parameters constant. Moreover, the model motivates a different view on the interpretation
of prediction market prices (e.g., Manski, 2006, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2006). Instead of
comparing prices to statistics of the belief distribution, the key question is whether beliefs
are driven by information rather than opinion (section 3).
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1.1 Related literature
I confine attention to the relevant theoretical contributions in this section.1 An informal
explanation of prediction market accuracy was put forth by Forsythe et al. (1992). In what
they dub marginal trader hypothesis (MTH), they argue that “prices are determined by the
marginal trader” and that marginal traders are “free of judgment bias” (i.e., have accurate
beliefs about the outcome). According to their definition (p. 1158 and fn. 21), a marginal
trader is a trader who places limit orders within 2 cents of the current price. However, they
are vague on how marginal traders “set prices.” Why should they have the power to set
prices, while biased traders—who may be as convinced of the correctness of their beliefs
as unbiased traders—do not? Indeed, the existence of a group with perfect forecast is not
sufficient for an accurate market forecast if wealth is bounded. A small subset of informed
traders cannot always outbid hordes of biased traders to keep the price at the fair value.
Nor is their presence necessary—possible biases of Republicans and Democrats may cancel
out to accurately predict the election vote share. Consequently, the MTH does not explain
the consistently good performance of prediction markets.
My information acquisition explanation has similarities to the MTH, in that both imply
that a small group of well informed traders can influence the market price to the better.
Interestingly, Forsythe et al. (1992) find that marginal traders (with good forecasts about
the outcome) have higher investment than the rest, which is consistent with the information
acquisition explanation. However, the information acquisition explanation differs in that
informed traders need not be free from judgment biases, need not have the power to set
prices, and need not have beliefs equal to what is implied by the market price.
Instead of explaining predictive accuracy, most of the theoretical literature on betting
markets tries to explain the favorite long-shot bias, i.e., that favorites’ chances are often
underestimated, while long-shots’ chances are overestimated. Explanations for the bias
go back to at least Ali (1977) for horse race betting. He shows that market probabilities
are less extreme than objective probabilities in a market with risk neutral bettors, whose
median belief is equal to the objective probability. For parimutuel betting, Ottaviani and
Sørensen (2009) show that inaccurate odds until just prior to the “last call” can result
from bettors without rational expectations, i.e., bettors do not anticipate the final odds
and make no inferences about the true state of the world from them. In a model with
heterogeneous priors, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2013) show that the competitive equilibrium
price under-reacts to information, and the effect is exacerbated for more spread out priors.
Page and Clemen (2013) argue theoretically and empirically that prediction markets, while
“reasonably well calibrated” for predictions in the near future, can be less accurate if the
outcome to be predicted is far in the future. According to them, the loss of accuracy
1A good introduction to prediction markets with examples is provided by Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004).
An overview of the large betting literature in economics can be found in Sauer (1998), and Thaler and Ziemba
(1988) provide an introduction to empirical anomalies in betting markets. Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos (2007)
give an extensive overview of the prediction market literature with categorization into subfields.
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is explained by reduced trading activity due to discounting of future gains. For a more
complete overview of explanations for the favorite long-shot bias, consult the references
in Ottaviani and Sørensen (2010). In all of these models, the origin of beliefs is either
unmodeled or informative signals are obtained by default with exogenous precision.
Another strand of literature focuses on how prediction market prices can be interpreted
(cf. Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004 for an overview of the different contracts traded in prediction
markets). Manski (2006) shows that the equilibrium price in a prediction market trading
WTA contracts with risk neutral traders does not generally correspond to the mean (or
median) probability estimate among traders, as conventional wisdom holds. In response,
Gjerstad (2005) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) show that the prediction market price is
close to the mean belief with risk averse traders. The model presented here proposes another
view on the issue (section 3). The question is not whether the price is close to the mean
or median belief, but whether it is close to the actual outcome. A distribution of opinions
may or may not have the correct mean or median. Instead, the key is whether beliefs and
consequently prices are informed or mere opinion, which can only be answered by specifying
how beliefs are formed. Endogenous information acquisition is one way to achieve this.
To my knowledge, information acquisition has been incorporated only once in the context
of prediction markets. Hanson and Oprea (2009) investigate whether a manipulator can
drive the price away from the fundamental value of the asset. Since his presence as well
as the strength of the manipulation preference is common knowledge, informed traders
may react to the manipulation attempt by obtaining more precise signals, thus raising
prediction market accuracy on average. In contrast to my model, they use the quantal
response equilibrium concept, all distributions are assumed to be common knowledge, all
random variables are normally distributed, and there are no budget constraints.
Among the first to consider information acquisition in economics more generally, Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1980) show that a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium with
costly information acquisition does not exist. The following literature (e.g., Verrecchia, 1982;
Barlevy and Veronesi, 2000; Peress, 2004) focuses on noisy rational expectations equilibria,
where the price is affected by noise and only partially revealing to retain the incentive
for information acquisition. In contrast to these papers, my model imposes no common
knowledge assumptions except for the observability of the price.
2 A model of costly information acquisition
An unknown state of the world (briefly ‘outcome’) from the set {A,B}, B = Ac, is exoge-
nously given, and will be publicly revealed in the future. For example, suppose a presidential
candidate (incumbent) faces a challenger in an upcoming election. Then A represents victory
by the incumbent in the election, whereas B means the challenger is victorious. Formally,
θ = 1 iff A and θ = 0 iff B, which is the parameter to be predicted.
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The economy is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral traders.2 Traders may be
heterogeneous in their endowment ωi ∈ (0, ω], ω <∞, which is distributed with cdf W (ωi).
Moreover, each trader i is characterized by prior qi, drawn from a continuous cdf Q(qi|θ, ωi),
which is i’s subjective estimate of Pr(θ = 1). This is a deviation from the common prior
assumption imposed in the better part of the literature, and implies that traders may dis-
agree about prospects. Diversity of opinion allows for interpretations like wishful thinking,
where opinions are influenced by preferences (Forsythe et al., 1999). It also makes the expla-
nation stronger, because in spite of many traders having wrong priors about the outcome,
the market price may nevertheless be an accurate forecast. The specification of prior belief
distribution Q allows for a dependence with endowment ωi.
Traders do not receive an informative signal about θ by default. Instead, they may
acquire a private binary signal, which is costly in terms of effort. The precision of the
signal is a function of effort ei ≥ 0, ν(ei) = Pr(si = 1|θ = 1) = Pr(si = 0|θ = 0). The
interpretation is that a trader can run Internet searches or talk to experts (signal), which
influence his beliefs about the outcome (posterior). But the effort cost may be too high,
so a trader may rather rely on his opinion (prior) to make the investment decision. Effort
costs are not paid out of the endowment, but enter linearly in the utility function.
Two state-contingent futures contracts—also called winner-take-all contracts—are traded
in a prediction market. One A-contract pays 1 iff θ = 1 to the holder, and 0 otherwise.
Conversely, one B-contract pays 1 iff θ = 0. The contracts are issued by the market maker.
The prediction market is thus a complete one-period Arrow-Debreu security market, like the
IEM prediction market described in the previous section. Let the price of the A-contract be
pi, and the price of the B-contract 1−pi, to rule out arbitrage opportunities. The profit per
A-contract held if A occurs is the difference of 1 and the price pi; the loss per A-contract if
B occurs is pi, the price paid.
The timing of trader decisions is shown in Figure 1. Each trader first decides on in-
formation acquisition effort ei, or equivalently signal precision νi ..= ν(ei), for a given
price pi (t = 0). Then he receives a signal with precision νi, and computes posterior
pi ..= Pr(θ = 1|si) using Bayes’ rule. The posterior is equal to the prior if zero effort,
i.e., νi = 1/2, is chosen. Based on posterior pi, endowment ωi, and price pi, the trader
decides which option to invest in by specifying investment volume ai(pi, ωi, pi), bi(pi, ωi, pi)
(t = 1). Finally, the outcome θ is revealed and the assets pay out (t = 2).
The equilibrium price pi∗ can be viewed as the market’s probability estimate that A
occurs. The more traders believe that A is going to occur, the more invest in A, thus raising
2As an alternative to risk neutrality, it is not clear whether agents should be modeled as risk averse or
risk loving in the context of betting. Almost all papers estimating risk preferences from betting data find
that traders are risk loving (e.g., Jullien and Salanie´, 2000 or Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010), whereas people
exhibit risk aversion in most other contexts. Risk neutrality, then, is a robust compromise. The aggregate
behavior induced by risk neutrality has the desirable trait of strictly decreasing aggregate demand if beliefs
are unchanged, which is not guaranteed under strong risk aversion (e.g., Quah, 2003). The qualitative
results carry over for slight risk aversion or risk loving preferences.
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t
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Choose precision
νi(qi, ωi, pi) ∈ [1/2, νˆ]
Observe si and
compute posterior
pi(qi, νi, si)
Choose investment
ai(pi, ωi, pi), bi(pi, ωi, pi)
Outcome θ is revealed,
assets pay out
Figure 1: Timing of decisions for trader i and payout.
the price (forecast) pi∗. The bias of the market forecast is |pi∗− θ|, so the best forecast is for
the market price to equal the fundamental value of the asset (i.e., 1 or 0). In competitive
equilibrium, the price equates the aggregate demand for A and B contracts, so that money
is redistributed from losers to winners, and the market operates at zero profit. Modeling
the market with the possibility to buy either of two complementary contracts is identical to
having just one contract with supply and demand side.
The competitive equilibrium concept used here requires that price pi∗ induces information
acquisition, which leads to beliefs and asset demands clearing the market for that same price.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium with endogenous information acquisition requires
1. a precision level function νi(qi, ωi, pi) for all i, which maximizes expected utility at t = 0
anticipating optimal behavior at t = 1,
2. posterior beliefs pi(qi, νi, si) for all i, computed via Bayes’ rule,
3. investment functions ai(pi, ωi, pi), bi(pi, ωi, pi) for all i, which maximize expected utility
subject to ai + bi ≤ ωi at t = 1, and
4. an equilibrium price pi∗, which induces information acquisition νi(qi, ωi, pi∗) at t = 0,
leading to beliefs pi(qi, νi, si) and investments ai(pi, ωi, pi
∗), bi(pi, ωi, pi∗) clearing the
asset market at t = 1, i.e.,∫ ω
0
∫ 1
0
ai(pi, ωi, pi
∗)/pi∗dQ(qi|θ, ωi)dW (ωi) =
∫ ω
0
∫ 1
0
bi(pi, ωi, pi
∗)/(1−pi∗)dQ(qi|θ, ωi)dW (ωi).
The difference to an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is that the equilibrium price must si-
multaneously induce information acquisition levels νi and clear the market for the resulting
investment functions ai, bi. Consequently, the equilibrium concept yields a single equilib-
rium price, even though in principle the sequential decisions of the traders (Figure 1) allow
for different prices at t = 0 and t = 1. To motivate this equilibrium notion, suppose a
Walrasian auctioneer announces an initial price pi0 at t = 0. Traders make their information
acquisition decision, update their beliefs and trade at t = 1, which leads to market clearing
7
price pi1 6= pi0 if pi0 does not fulfill the above definition. Thus, if we were to repeat the proce-
dure with pi1 as initial price, traders might make different information acquisition decisions
and ultimately different investment decisions, possibly leading to yet another price. If this
taˆtonnement procedure stops for some pi0 = pi1, then pi0 = pi∗ as defined above.
Many financial market models use rational expectations equilibria to explain the infor-
mativeness of asset prices. The involved assumptions are strong. As Radner (1979) writes,
traders require “‘models’ or ‘expectations’ of how equilibrium prices are related to initial
information,” in order to infer and pool information from the observable price. In contrast,
this model provides an explanation that does not rely on the strict common knowledge as-
sumptions of rational expectations equilibria. As in actual prediction markets, traders do
not know the beliefs or endowments of other traders, and do not know if trades are moti-
vated by hedging or manipulation motives, i.e., they do not have the necessary ‘models’ to
extract information from the price. But the price may nonetheless be correlated with the
true state of the world, because signals are informative. The explanation of why the market
price can be a good forecast relies on the realistic assumptions of endowment asymmetries,
endogenous information acquisition, and a competitive equilibrium, which approximates the
double auction mechanism used in asset markets.
2.1 Investment and information acquisition decision
In this section, I determine the optimal individual information acquisition and investment
decisions for a given price pi. In the next section, individual decisions will be aggregated to
determine the equilibrium price pi∗. Going backwards on the time line, taking posterior pi
and price pi as given, the investment problem of the risk neutral trader at t = 1 is
max
ai,bi≥0
pi[(1− pi)ai/pi − bi] + (1− pi)[pibi/(1− pi)− ai] s.t. ai + bi ≤ ωi.
That is, the trader believes A occurs with probability pi, yielding a profit of (1− pi)ai/pi on
the ai investment, and a loss of all B investment bi. Payoffs for B follow similarly. The linear
utility function yields a corner solution, which is ai = ωi, bi = 0 if pi > pi and ai = 0, bi = ωi
if pi < pi. Henceforth, I will use the short-hand αi(pi) ..= ωi/pi and βi(pi) ..= ωi/(1 − pi) to
denote the maximum amount of A or B-contracts bought, respectively.
Anticipating these investment decisions, the trader decides how much costly effort to
spend, which determines the precision of the signal. Note that the effort choice at t = 0 has
to induce investment behavior which depends on the signal at t = 1 (‘discriminating effort
level’), otherwise the effort cost is incurred for no benefit. For example, if the resulting
posterior is pi(si = 0, qi, ei) < pi(si = 1, qi, ei) < pi, then exerting effort ei > 0 would not
make a difference in the investment decision—for either realization of the signal i invests in
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B—and therefore cannot be optimal. The minimum discriminating effort level is
e˜i = min
e
{e : pi(si = 1, qi, e) ≥ pi ≥ pi(si = 0, qi, e)}.
The expected utility from choosing a discriminating signal precision before observing the
signal (t = 0) is
EU(ei ≥ e˜i) = qiν(ei)(1−pi)αi− qi(1−ν(ei))ωi+(1− qi)ν(ei)piβi− (1− qi)(1−ν(ei))ωi−ei.
That is, from his prior perspective, trader i anticipates that he will invest in A iff si = 1
and in B iff si = 0, that the signal will be correct with probability ν(ei), and wrong with
probability 1− ν(ei), and he weighs each case according to his prior belief qi.
From the definition of e˜i, if qi > pi, then pi(si = 1, qi, e˜i) > pi, consequently pi(si =
0, qi, e˜i) = pi, which implies the minimum discriminating precision level
ν˜i ..= ν(e˜i) =
qi/pi
qi/pi + (1− qi)/(1− pi) .
Similarly, if qi < pi, then pi(si = 1, qi, e˜i) = pi and pi(si = 0, qi, e˜i) < pi, which implies
ν˜i =
(1− qi)/(1− pi)
qi/pi + (1− qi)/(1− pi) .
The expected utility of not acquiring information is
EU(ei = 0) =
qi(1− pi)αi − (1− qi)piαi = (qi − pi)αi if qi > pi,(1− qi)piβi − qi(1− pi)βi = (pi − qi)βi if qi < pi. (1)
A trader prefers information acquisition, i.e., a positive effort level, only if the benefits
from the more informed investment decision exceed the effort costs. Hence, positive effort,
assuming νi ..= ν(ei) ≥ ν˜i, is incentive compatible iff for qi > pi
qiνi(1−pi)αi− qi(1− νi)piαi + (1− qi)νipiβi− (1− qi)(1−pi)(1− νi)βi− ei ≥ (qi−pi)αi. (2)
Solving the first order condition (νee < 0) for the LHS, the unconstrained optimal positive
effort level is
e∗i = ν
−1
e
(
1
qiαi + (1− qi)βi
)
> 0,
where νe is the partial derivative with respect to effort. The optimal level exists under the
Inada conditions νe(e)→ 0 as e→∞ and νe(e)→∞ as e→ 0.
For explicit solutions, I assume a specific form for the effort-precision function, ν(e) =
min{1
2
(
√
e+ 1), νˆ}, νˆ < 1, so that ν(e = 0) is normalized to 1/2 (an uninformative signal),
and a unique unconstrained optimum exists. Because the square root function is unbounded,
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I impose an upper bound νˆ < 1, so that traders cannot learn the true state of the world per-
fectly by investing a lot of effort. In this specification, the optimal unconstrained precision
is
ν∗i ..= ν(e
∗
i ) =
qiαi + (1− qi)βi + 4
8
.
Formally, a marginal precision increase makes a correct investment (i.e., profits) in either
state of the world more likely, and a wrong investment (i.e., losses) less likely. Adding the
benefits of more likely gains and less likely losses, weighted by prior probability, gives the
marginal benefit qiαi+(1−q)βi. The marginal effort cost is 8ν−4, and the optimal precision
equates the two.
The upper and lower bound of incentive compatible precisions νi
..= ν(qi, ωi, pi) and
νi ..= ν(qi, ωi, pi) if qi > pi and νi ≥ ν˜i are the solutions to the quadratic equation (2),
(νi, νi) =
qiαi + (1− qi)βi + 4
8
±
√
(qiαi + (1− qi)βi + 4)2
64
− 1/4(1 + qiαi). (3)
For qi < pi, the RHS (expected utility without information acquisition) of (2) changes,
resulting in solutions
(νi, νi) =
qiαi + (1− qi)βi + 4
8
±
√
(qiαi + (1− qi)βi + 4)2
64
− 1/4(1 + (1− qi)βi). (4)
In short, i acquires information iff [νi, νi] ∩ [ν˜i, νˆ] 6= ∅, and chooses ν∗i if it is in the inter-
section. The following proposition characterizes the information acquisition decision.
Proposition 1.
i. Incentive compatible precision levels always discriminate, i.e., ν(qi, ωi, pi) ∈ R =⇒
ν(qi, ωi, pi) ≥ ν˜(qi, pi).
ii. The incentive compatibility constraint to acquire information becomes less stringent as
|qi − pi| decreases. If qi ≤ pi ≤ 1/2 or 1/2 ≤ pi ≤ qi, then ∂νi∂|qi−pi| ≤ 0. Moreover, if
prior beliefs in the economy are distributed according to a density q with full support on
[0, 1], then there exists a positive probability mass of traders with prior qi around pi who
acquire information.
iii. The incentive compatibility constraint becomes less stringent as ωi increases for suffi-
ciently large ωi. If, for some ωi > 0, informative signals are acquired, then larger ωi
strictly increases signal precision until νi = νˆ. (
∂νi
∂ωi
≥ 0)
Proof. See Appendix.
Traders who have a prior belief close to the price pi are more likely to acquire information
(ii.). To understand the intuition, note that traders compute the expected utility based on
their prior belief when deciding about acquiring information. Whenever the prior deviates
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Figure 2: Information acquisition decision: optimal (solid line), incentive compatible (shaded
area) and minimum discriminating (dotted line) precision levels, with varying endow-
ment ω and price pi, depending on prior belief qi.
considerably from the price, the trader expects large gains |qi−pi| per contract held without
information acquisition (see (1)). This can be interpreted as a trader having a strong
opinion about the outcome, who does not expect to be swayed by evidence and hence does
not acquire it. Conversely, the trader expects only small gains if qi is close to pi, so his
opinion about the outcome is not as strong, and he is willing to acquire information and
possibly revise his beliefs if there is evidence contradicting his prior.
All else equal, higher endowment makes information acquisition more likely, or increases
information seeking effort, if endowment is sufficiently large (iii.). The intuition is that,
while endowment (and thus potential gains and losses) scale up, the cost of acquiring in-
formation remains the same. Thus, due to higher stakes, traders want to be more certain
that their investment decision will be the right one. Peress (2004) obtains this comparative
static for the same reason in his rational expectations model.
Notice that the motivation of the traders is not to make the best prediction possible. If
that were the case, traders would also want to obtain information if the prior is far from
the price. Instead, the motivation is to maximize utility, and that might require saving on
effort costs and accepting inferior information.
These results are illustrated in Figure 2, in which the optimal precision level ν∗, the
range of incentive compatible precision levels [ν, ν] (conditional on being discriminating)
and the minimum discriminating precision level ν˜ for different values of ω, pi, qi are plotted.
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It illustrates how a higher endowment increases the range of priors where information ac-
quisition is incentive compatible, and increases the chosen precision, until ν∗ reaches upper
bound νˆ (which is not included in the figure for visibility). The figure also suggests that
the range of types qi investing effort is smaller if the market price deviates from pi = 1/2.
2.2 Competitive equilibrium
How does the possibility of information acquisition affect the forecast of the prediction
market? The following example illustrates how information acquisition can improve the
forecast compared to a model without, as for example used in Gjerstad (2005), Wolfers and
Zitzewitz (2006), or Manski (2006).
Example. Suppose θ = 1, each trader has endowment ω = 1 and priors qi are uniformly
distributed, i.e., qi ∼ U [0, 1]. Without information acquisition, the equilibrium price is
pi∗0 = 1/2, because at that price half of the population is willing to invest in A and half in
B, thus clearing the market. The equilibrium price divides the continuum in traders who
always invest in A (qi > pi
∗
0), and traders who always invest in B (qi < pi
∗
0). I shall call
these ‘categorical’ traders, because their decision is based solely on their prior, and therefore
independent of the true state of the world.
The previous section showed that information acquisition is incentive compatible only
for traders with prior close to the price. When allowing information acquisition (keeping
the price constant), traders with qi < pi
∗
0 just left of 1/2 turn from categorical B traders into
discriminatory traders acquiring information (who trade contingent on signal), and the share
of those investing in the correct option A improves from 0 to νi(qi, ω, pi
∗
0) > 1/2. Conversely,
traders with qi > pi
∗
0 just right of 1/2 turn from categorical A traders into discriminatory
traders, and the share of those investing in A decreases from 1 to νi(qi, ω, pi
∗
0) > 1/2. The
mass of traders turned into discriminatory traders is equal for both sides about 1/2 if pi = 1/2
(Figure 2), so the mass of traders in the population willing to invest in the correct option
A increases. As a consequence, the equilibrium price must change. Indeed, if demand is
weakly decreasing in the price, it must increase toward the true value θ = 1, because a
larger mass than 1/2 is willing to invest in A at price pi = 1/2.
As the example illustrates, the possibility of information acquisition can sway traders
with wrong opinion to invest in the correct outcome instead, thus improving the forecast.
More formally, let ν(qi, ωi, pi) denote the precision level resulting from the endogenously
chosen information acquisition effort. For readability, I will omit the conditioning set of
cdf Q(qi|θ, ωi) in the following. Following definition 1, the equilibrium price pi∗ is implicitly
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defined as the fixed point of (1{.} is the indicator function)∫ ω
0
∫ 1
0
ai(pi, ωi, pi
∗)/pi∗dQ(qi)dW (ωi) =
∫ ω
0
∫ 1
0
bi(pi, ωi, pi
∗)/(1− pi∗)dQ(qi)dW (ωi)
⇐⇒
∫ ω
0
ωi
(∫ 1
0
1{ν(qi, ωi, pi∗) = 1/2}1{qi ≥ pi∗}+ 1{ν(qi, ωi, pi∗) > 1/2}
[θν(qi, ωi, pi
∗) + (1− θ)(1− ν(qi, ωi, pi∗))]dQ(qi)− pi∗
)
dW (ωi) = 0,
where 1{ν(pi∗, qi) = 1/2}1{qi ≥ pi∗} indicates categorical A traders, who do not acquire
information and always invest in A, and the remaining term is the contribution of discrim-
inatory traders to A demand, who invest according to their information. They invest in A
only in ν(qi, ωi, pi
∗) of the cases if the true state of the world is A, otherwise in 1−ν(qi, ωi, pi∗)
of the cases. The equivalence is shown in the proof of Proposition 2 (ii.). Rewriting the
share of categorical A investors in the population at pi∗,∫ 1
0
1{ν(qi, ωi, pi∗) = 1/2}1{qi ≥ pi∗}dQ(qi) =
∫ 1
pi∗
1{ν(qi, ωi, pi∗) = 1/2}dQ(qi) = 1−Q(tu(pi∗)),
where tu (tl) is the upper (lower) threshold for incentive compatible priors. Explicit expres-
sions for the thresholds, which depend on pi and ωi, are derived in the appendix. Since the
precision is bounded by νˆ, for θ = 1∫ 1
0
1{ν(qi, ωi, pi∗) > 1/2}ν(qi, ωi, pi∗)dQ(qi) =
∫ tu
tl
min {ν∗(qi, ωi, pi∗), νˆ} dQ(qi).
Hence, the equilibrium price pi∗ if θ = 1 fulfills∫ ω
0
(
1−Q(tu) +
∫ tu
tl
min
{
qiαi + (1− qi)βi + 4
8
, νˆ
}
dQ(qi)− pi∗
)
ωidW (ωi) = 0. (5)
The following proposition shows that an equilibrium always exists, and can be shown to be
unique in most cases.
Proposition 2.
i. There exists an equilibrium price pi∗ fulfilling definition 1,
ii. which is implicitly defined as the fixed point of (5).
iii. Assuming homogeneous endowment (ωi = ω), the equilibrium is unique for ω such that
νˆ is binding,
iv. and unique for ω such that νˆ is non-binding if ω is small.
Proof. See Appendix.
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In most cases, A-demand decreases in response to a price increase, because categorical
A traders with qi close to tu are replaced by discriminatory traders, who only invest in A in
νi < 1 of the cases, and discriminatory traders with qi close to tl are replaced by categorical
B traders, who never invest in A. Let us call this the price effect. Still, the demand for the
A-contract need not necessarily be decreasing in the price. Since the precision chosen by
discriminatory traders ν∗(qi, ωi, pi) increases for large pi, a price increase may result in more
investments in A if θ = 1. However, this effect is strong enough to reverse the price effect
only if pi is large and the distribution of priors is very unsmooth.3 Since this is a rather
artificial situation, in the following I assume demand to be weakly decreasing in the price.
The validity of this assumption is confirmed in all numerical examples.
In order to be more specific on how the distribution of priors affects the equilibrium
outcome, I consider two parametric forms of Q. First, priors may be distributed according
to normal distribution N (µ, σ2). For computational ease, instead of truncating at 0 and
1, any probability mass that would have been truncated is assumed to be located at the
corners.4 Second, the triangular distribution is a computationally simpler distribution that
also allows to shift probability mass closer to or farther away from the truth. This property is
important to answer how a change of opinion in the economy influences the market prediction
pi∗ or whether a more informed public generates better forecasts. The triangular distribution
is easier to handle analytically and there are no boundary issues. It is distributed on the
interval [0, 1] with the density peak at d ∈ [0, 1] and density function
q(qi) =
2dqi if qi ≤ d,2(1−qi)
1−d if qi > d.
The following proposition gives some comparative statics regarding the market price if
θ = 1. This condition is without loss of generality, since outcomes A and B can be redefined.
The results are sufficient conditions for a shift of priors toward the true value to reduce bias
(increase the equilibrium price), and for an endowment increase to reduce bias. Assumption
pi∗ ≥ 1/2 means that ω,Q are such that the market correctly predicts the favorite A, i.e.,
pi∗ is closer to θ = 1 than to 0, prior to the exogenous parameter change.
3For example, a distribution with small density for qi around tu and around tl and a large density for qi
between tl and tu leads to little loss of A-demand via price effect when the price increases, while all qi in
the interior increase their precision.
4In the comparative statics analysis, we are interested in how the market price changes if the prior belief
distribution changes. However, the cdf of the truncated normal distribution can be decreasing in µ at
some x ∈ (0, 1), because of truncation. This means the equilibrium price in the model without information
acquisition (Manski, 2006) can decrease in response to an increase of µ, so truncation introduces additional
effects depending on the parameters, which interacts with the comparative static effects to be analyzed.
For example, a negative response to a µ-increase could be due to changes in truncation, or due to reduced
information acquisition effort. To solve this problem, I assume any truncated mass is located at the corners,
so that the prior belief distribution in the interior is just the cdf of a normal distribution, which is always
decreasing in response to an increase of µ.
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Proposition 3. Comparative statics if demand is non-increasing in the price, ω is homo-
geneous and θ = 1.
i. Any change in the prior distribution from Q to R such that Q(qi) > R(qi) ∀qi ∈ (0, 1)
increases the market price pi∗ if νˆ is binding, unless all agents in the Q-economy already
acquire information.
ii. With priors qi ∼ N (µ, σ2) and ω < (1 − pi∗)4, an upward shift of µ increases the
equilibrium price pi∗ for each µ, σ if pi∗ ≤ 1/2.
iii. With priors qi ∼ N (µ, σ2) and endowment ω < (1− pi∗)4 sufficiently small, an upward
shift of µ increases the equilibrium price pi∗ for each µ, σ and pi∗.
iv. With priors from the triangular distribution, an increase in the mode value d leads to
an increase of the market prediction pi∗ if d < tl or d > tu.
v. Higher endowment increases information in the economy as measured by
DA =
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗(qi), νˆ}dQ(qi),
i.e., more traders obtain information of higher precision.
vi. For any distribution of priors with non-increasing density q the market prediction pi∗
increases in response to a non-binding endowment increase if pi∗ ≥ 1/2.
vii. With priors qi ∼ N (µ, σ2) the market prediction pi∗ increases in response to an endow-
ment increase for pi∗ ≥ 1/2, νˆ non-binding and |µ− tl| < |µ− tu|.
Proof. See Appendix.
The market price increases if probability mass is shifted towards higher values of qi and
if the precision is unaffected by price (i.). In particular, this includes an increase of d for
the triangular distribution or an increase of µ for the normal distribution. However, if
the precision cap is not reached, this need not always hold. If pi > 1/2, then the optimal
precision ν∗(qi, pi) is decreasing in qi, because the profitable state B (price only 1−pi < 1/2)
is considered less likely. Thus, if the mass of traders with high qi increases, then it can
decrease the mass of agents investing in A for a given price pi. In particular, this occurs
for some parameter values using the triangular distribution with tl < d < tu, or for the
normal distribution, pi > 1/2 and σ small. It is therefore possible that a population with
more accurate opinions produces worse forecasts, because it invests less in acquisition effort.
Still, in most cases the comparative static holds, because more weight on high values of qi
implies more categorical A traders and more weight on discriminatory traders, who favor A.
Moreover, small non-monotonicity is usually a local problem and vanishes for sufficiently
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large discrete changes of the exogenous variable. The price always increases in response to
increases of ω or µ in the numerical example using discrete changes (section 2.3).
Parts (ii.) and (iii.) state that a shift of µ toward the true value θ = 1 increases the
market price if endowments are sufficiently low or if pi∗ < 1/2. Intuitively, if endowment
is low, then the mass of discriminatory traders is low and so the fact that the precision of
discriminatory traders may be reduced has little weight.
Parts (v.)-(vii.) consider an endowment increase in the economy. While higher endow-
ment always increases information in the economy as measured by investment from discrim-
inatory traders in the correct outcome A, this need not imply that the bias always decreases
in response to an endowment increase. After all, if opinions happen to be very accurate,
then correct opinions are replaced with information that is correct in only ν∗i < 1 of the
cases. Still, as with a shift of priors toward the correct outcome, this comparative static
holds in all numerical cases (section 2.3).
2.3 Numerical example
2.3.1 Preliminaries
The purpose of this section is threefold. First, it demonstrates that this model produces
better predictions than the model without information acquisition (Manski, 2006). Second,
it quantifies the impact of exogenous variables on pi∗. And third, it shows the comparative
statics are less ambiguous for discrete changes than the theoretical results may let on.
I calculate the equilibrium price pi∗ numerically for various parameter values. Priors
are assumed to be normally distributed, but any probability mass
∫∞
1
q(qi)dqi is bunched
at 1 (similarly all mass below 0 is bunched at 0). This is preferable to truncation, as the
truncated mass depends on parameters µ, σ, which hinders identification of comparative
static effects (see footnote 4). Consequently, µ 6= 1/2 is not actually the mean of the prior
distribution, but merely a position parameter.
The equilibrium price with information acquisition is defined in (5), where (Φ denotes
the cdf of the standard normal distribution, φ its density function)
Q(qi) = Φ
(
qi − µ
σ
)
, q(qi) =
1
σ
φ
(
qi − µ
σ
)
∀qi ∈ (0, 1).
The equilibrium price without information acquisition, where traders rely solely on their
priors, is given by (e.g., Manski, 2006)∫ ω
0
(1−Q(pi∗0)− pi∗0)ωidW (ωi) = 0.
I fixed νˆ = 0.95 as maximal signal precision, i.e., no trader can perfectly infer the
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Table 1: Equilibrium price with information acquisition pi∗ for various parameter values.
ω µ σ θ pi∗ DB CB pi∗0
0.5 0.1 0.1 0 0.18 0.13 0.69 0.19
0.5 0.1 0.3 0 0.27 0.07 0.66 0.28
0.5 0.5 0.1 0 0.49 0.29 0.22 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.3 0 0.49 0.1 0.41 0.5
0.5 0.7 0.1 0 0.65 0.23 0.12 0.66
0.5 0.7 0.3 0 0.61 0.09 0.3 0.61
1 0.1 0.1 0 0.15 0.32 0.52 0.19
1 0.1 0.3 0 0.24 0.17 0.59 0.28
1 0.5 0.1 0 0.43 0.53 0.03 0.5
1 0.5 0.3 0 0.46 0.24 0.3 0.5
1 0.7 0.1 0 0.6 0.39 0.01 0.66
1 0.7 0.3 0 0.58 0.22 0.2 0.61
5 0.1 0.1 0 0.04 0.77 0.18 0.19
5 0.1 0.3 0 0.09 0.51 0.4 0.28
5 0.5 0.1 0 0.13 0.87 0 0.5
5 0.5 0.3 0 0.24 0.69 0.07 0.5
5 0.7 0.1 0 0.28 0.72 0 0.66
5 0.7 0.3 0 0.37 0.6 0.02 0.61
ω µ σ θ pi∗ DA CA pi∗0
0.5 0.1 0.1 1 0.2 0.12 0.08 0.19
0.5 0.1 0.3 1 0.28 0.07 0.21 0.28
0.5 0.5 0.1 1 0.51 0.29 0.22 0.5
0.5 0.5 0.3 1 0.51 0.1 0.41 0.5
0.5 0.7 0.1 1 0.67 0.25 0.42 0.66
0.5 0.7 0.3 1 0.62 0.09 0.53 0.61
1 0.1 0.1 1 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.19
1 0.1 0.3 1 0.3 0.17 0.13 0.28
1 0.5 0.1 1 0.57 0.53 0.03 0.5
1 0.5 0.3 1 0.54 0.24 0.3 0.5
1 0.7 0.1 1 0.71 0.54 0.17 0.66
1 0.7 0.3 1 0.65 0.22 0.43 0.61
5 0.1 0.1 1 0.44 0.44 0 0.19
5 0.1 0.3 1 0.45 0.45 0.01 0.28
5 0.5 0.1 1 0.87 0.87 0 0.5
5 0.5 0.3 1 0.76 0.69 0.07 0.5
5 0.7 0.1 1 0.93 0.93 0 0.66
5 0.7 0.3 1 0.85 0.66 0.19 0.61
Description: The table displays the equilibrium price with information acquisition pi∗ and without (pi∗0).
Priors are drawn from distribution N (µ, σ2), and endowment is ω. The true state of the world is θ, so
the bias is pi∗ − θ. DA is the probability mass of discriminatory bettors betting on A in equilibrium, while
CA is the probability mass of categorical bettors betting on A. The upper bound of the signal precision is
νˆ = 0.95.
true state of the world by investing sufficient information acquisition effort. Endowment is
homogeneous, with ω as a parameter to be varied. Finally, I confirmed numerically that the
equilibrium is unique.
Table 1 displays the equilibrium price with information acquisition (pi∗), and without
(pi∗0), as well as the corresponding parameter values µ, σ, ω, θ. The bias of the market
prediction pi∗− θ can be easily computed. It also shows Dj, j = A iff θ = 1, j = B iff θ = 0,
which is the probability mass of discriminatory traders investing in the correct outcome in
equilibrium. This is a measure of information in the economy. A high value of Dj either
means many traders acquire information, or that information is good (i.e., signals with high
precision are acquired). For θ = 1, DA =
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗(pi∗, qi), νˆ}dQ(qi). Cj is the probability
mass of categorical traders investing in the correct outcome, i.e., the mass of traders that
does not acquire information in equilibrium, but has prior qi that makes them invest in the
correct option. For θ = 1, CA = 1−Q(tu). By definition of equilibrium, CA +DA = pi∗.
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2.3.2 Numerical results
A higher endowment ω leads to smaller bias |pi∗ − θ|. The reason is that, first, more
endowment leads to a higher mass of traders acquiring information. And second, traders
who do acquire information choose more precise information (i.e., higher precision). This
is reflected by Dj, the probability mass of discriminatory traders investing in the correct
outcome, which is increasing in endowment. Some correctly investing categorical traders
are turned into discriminating traders, who choose the wrong outcome in 1−νi of the cases,
but the net effect as represented by pi∗ is nevertheless unambiguously bias reducing. As
endowment rises, the market price is more and more driven by information rather than
prior beliefs. For example, at ω = 5, θ = 1 and σ = 0.1, the probability mass of categorical
A traders CA is 0 (rounded), so it is almost exclusively discriminatory traders investing in
A and supporting the equilibrium, while CA is positive for lower endowment.
Further, µ closer to the true state θ decreases the absolute value of the bias. This not
surprising, since it means there is a larger probability mass of categorical traders for each
given price pi willing to invest in the right choice, all else equal. And although the results in
Proposition 3 seemed to suggest that pi∗ may not always be monotone in µ, these examples
show that for plausible cases it is.
The effect of σ is ambiguous. Generally, the parameter shifts probability mass closer to
or farther away from µ. If µ is small, then a higher σ means there is a larger probability
mass at high values of qi. Consequently, a higher σ increases bias for low µ and θ = 0, or
for high µ and θ = 1. That is, there are more wrongly investing categorical traders, which
drive the market price in the wrong direction. Similarly, a larger σ improves the prediction
if µ is far from θ, because it increases the mass of correctly investing categorical traders.
The effect is more pronounced with lower ω, where the prior has more influence on the
market price. With larger σ, the amount of information is reduced (with the exception of
θ = 1, ω = 5, µ = .1). This is because there is less probability mass for priors around the
market price, which is usually close to µ.
The prediction in the model without information acquisition pi∗0 is unaffected by endow-
ment, because it does not influence beliefs. Moreover, the prediction is the same independent
of the state of the world, because investment decisions are not correlated with θ. Finally,
the forecasts in the model with information acquisition are never worse, and usually strictly
better than in the model without. Averaging over the 36 cases in Table 1, the forecast bias
in the Manski model is larger by 0.1, i.e., about 10.5 percentage points, given the same
endowment and prior distribution. Therefore, allowing for information acquisition goes a
long way in explaining forecast accuracy. But note that the model without information
acquisition may produce better forecasts for very unsmooth prior distributions Q, as the
following example shows.
Example. Take any ω and Q with non-increasing aggregate demand. Without loss of
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generality, consider θ = 1. Comparing the model without (no) information acquisition
(NIA) with equilibrium price pi∗0 and the model with acquisition (IA), bias in IA is smaller
(pi∗ > pi∗0) if and only if A-investments by discriminatory traders in IA more than replace
investments by categorical A traders in NIA that are discriminatory traders in IA at pi = pi∗0.
That is, if and only if, evaluated at pi∗0,∫ tu
tl
min
{
qiαi + (1− qi)βi + 4
8
, νˆ
}
dQ(qi) > Q(tu)−Q(pi∗0). (6)
In this case, price pi∗0 leads to excess demand for A in IA, so, because demand is non-
increasing, only pi∗ > pi∗0 clears the market. To construct a counterexample, consider the
piecewise uniform density function
q(qi) =
m, for qi ∈ [0, 1/4] ∪ (1/2, 3/4]2−m, for qi ∈ (1/4, 1/2] ∪ (3/4, 1],
where 2 > m > 1. The equilibrium price without information acquisition is pi∗0 = 1/2,
since 1 − Q(1/2) = 1/2. Just right of 1/2 is a higher density than just left of 1/2. By
symmetry, |tl − 1/2| = |tu − 1/2| for pi = 1/2. Now, ω small enough such that tu ≤ 3/4
implies Q(tu)−Q(1/2) = (tu− 1/2)m, while the LHS of (6) is 2ν∗(tu− 1/2) (ν∗ is constant
for all qi ∈ [0, 1] at pi = 1/2). Hence, the market price is larger (bias is smaller) in IA if and
only if ν∗(ω, pi = 1/2) > m/2.
Intuitively, if there is a large probability mass of categorical A traders in NIA, who are
discriminatory traders with low signal precision in IA, while only a small probability mass
of categorical B traders is affected, then demand for the A-contract at pi = 1/2 decreases
when allowing for information acquisition. By the demand monotonicity assumption, this
implies pi∗ < pi∗0, i.e., greater bias given θ = 1. Nevertheless, for large ω or smoother prior
distributions information acquisition improves the market forecast.
2.4 Endogenous weighting: endowment heterogeneity
In elections or votes, each “voice” has equal weight. For purposes of preference aggregation,
this may be just, but if voting is meant to determine an objectively correct state, then equal
weighting need not yield the best outcome. Indeed, if pooling of information is not possible,
the optimal weighting is to give full weight to the agent with the best information about
the state. However, it is usually not obvious who that agent is. In the asset market, this
dilemma is solved endogenously by weighting each bet with its wager, or each trade with
its volume (“weighting effect”). Combining with the earlier result that higher endowment
induces more information acquisition (“incentive effect”), the market endogenously gives
higher weight to traders with better forecasts, all else equal.
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This interaction of the incentive effect and the weighting effect is my main explanation
why prediction markets work. It is not necessary that all traders in the economy have
accurate beliefs about the outcome. Instead, it is sufficient to have a few high endowment
agents, who choose to be informed because of large stakes, and can drive the market price in
the right direction due to their large weight in the market. In conventional financial markets,
these high endowment agents may be hedge funds and investment banking divisions, who can
move millions of dollars and have access to research into potential investment opportunities
that smaller investors cannot afford.
In the following, I assume for simplicity there are two endowment groups (ω1, Q1) and
(ω2, Q2), represented by endowment and prior distribution. The share of traders of group
1 in the economy is 1 > γ > 0. The equilibrium price in a hypothetical market populated
only by group 1 is pi∗1, and the price in the hypothetical low endowment market is pi
∗
2,
which is a way of expressing prior distribution and endowment of the group in terms of
a forecast. Lemma 4 in the Appendix shows that the market price in the economy with
both groups is strictly between pi∗1 and pi
∗
2 if demand is non-increasing in the price, i.e.,
min{pi∗1, pi∗2} < pi∗ < max{pi∗1, pi∗2}. An immediate consequence of this result is the following.
Corollary 5. If the economy consists of two endowment groups ω1 > ω2, and demand is
non-increasing in the price for both groups, then the market price pi∗ has a smaller bias than
the price in a market consisting only of the low endowment group pi∗2 if and only if the bias
in the high endowment economy is smaller (|θ − pi∗1| < |θ − pi∗2|).
This corollary implies that if one could add a group of high endowment traders or traders
with better information to the market, then the market prediction improves as a result. To
analyze the weighting effect, consider an equal weight price I∗, defined in the general case
as ∫ 1
0
1{ai(qi, ωi, I∗) > bi(qi, ωi, I∗)}dQ(qi) = I∗.
The price is determined by equating the share of the number of investments in A (instead
of the share of dollars in A) with the price I∗ that induces these investments. This method
gives equal weight to every trader, but it is not a market clearing price whenever it diverges
from pi∗. Thus, the market maker might have to use his own funds to pay the winners, or
he might make a profit. If endowment is homogeneous or if pi∗1 = pi
∗
2, then pi
∗ = I∗.
Proposition 6. Suppose the economy consists of two endowment groups ω1 > ω2, and
demand is non-increasing in the price for both groups. If pi∗1 > pi
∗
2, then pi
∗ > I∗. Similarly,
pi∗1 < pi
∗
2 implies pi
∗ < I∗.
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 7. If |pi∗1 − θ| < |pi∗2 − θ|, then endogenous weighting compared to equal weighting
is unambiguously bias reducing, i.e., |pi∗−θ| < |I∗−θ|, but the improvement is smaller than
for optimal weighting, i.e., |pi∗1 − θ| < |pi∗ − θ|.
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As shown in the previous sections, a larger endowment leads to smaller bias |θ − pi∗|.
Thus, the endogenous weighting implied by market clearing is bias reducing if prior beliefs
and endowment are independent in the economy, or if higher endowment groups tend to
have more accurate priors. An evolutionary argument makes the latter condition plausi-
ble: traders with better priors have better forecasts, so they increase their endowment by
making the right investments. Hence, over time high endowment traders are the ones with
better priors (e.g., Servan-Schreiber et al., 2004). Conversely, traders with bad priors “die
out,” be it because they go broke or because they recognize their inability to forecast and
stop investing. Endogenous weighting increases bias only if the low endowment group has
considerably better priors to compensate for the inferior information due to the incentive
effect, so that pi∗2 is closer to θ than pi
∗
1. In summary, the endogenous weighting of the market
improves on the effect of information acquisition by giving more weight to better forecasts.
3 Discussion: Interpreting prediction market prices
Several authors have asked what prediction market prices represent. Contrary to common
interpretation, Manski (2006) shows that an equilibrium price with risk neutral traders,
interpreted as probability forecast, may be far from the mean belief in the economy. Gjerstad
(2005) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006) demonstrate that this disparity is smaller for risk
averse agents. They use a non-Bayesian set-up with arbitrary distribution of beliefs, which
may or may not be close to the actual outcome. Consequently, the mean belief is a convenient
summary statistic, but it may not be a good predictor of the outcome. What we are instead
interested in is how price pi∗ relates to the outcome θ. The key question is whether the
price is driven by opinion, which may be close or far from the truth, or by information
and evidence, which is correlated with the outcome and therefore more reliable. Even
if initial beliefs about the outcome are off, the prediction market may generate a good
forecast if agents have sufficient incentives to seek out information and revise their beliefs
and investments. Of course, it is possible to interpret the belief distribution of Manski
et al. as posterior distribution after information acquisition. Any information acquisition
equilibrium based on prior distribution Q can be reached in the model without information
acquisition and distribution R such that (assuming homogeneous endowment)
1−R(pi∗) = 1−Q(tu) +
∫ tu(pi∗)
tl(pi∗)
min
{
qiαi(pi
∗) + (1− qi)βi(pi∗) + 4
8
, νˆ
}
dQ(qi) = pi
∗.
Yet, merely assuming such a distribution without modeling its generation does not give any
insights into its informational content. Moreover, meaningful comparative static analysis
is not possible, as R is fixed for ω and Q, and changes in information acquisition (e.g.,
incentive compatibility) would not be captured.
To understand the role of information in the price, suppose all traders acquire signals of
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equal precision ν > 1/2, and invest according to their signal, i.e., in A iff si = 1 and in B iff
si = 0. Then the unique equilibrium price for the case θ = 1 is pi
∗ = ν, because exactly the
fraction ν of the population invests in A. Hence, the equilibrium price represents the quality
of information in this economy and the prediction market favorite would perfectly forecast
the outcome. But traders do not always invest based on solid information. In the general
model with equilibrium (5), the price represents a mixture of information and opinion.
Taking only the investments of informed traders, DA/DB reveals the true state of the world
perfectly in the continuum (DA/DB > 1 iff θ = 1), but in anonymous markets these can
hardly be told apart from investments driven by opinion. Thus, if neither endowments ωi
nor the distribution of priors Q in the economy are known, the price could be anything
from an aggregation of wrong opinions to a very precise forecast. If at least endowments
were known, then an outside observer would infer, ceteris paribus, that the price is a better
predictor the larger the endowments.
A market observer, who knows that accuracy of priors and endowment are not negatively
correlated, can improve on the market forecast by giving more weight to large investments.
In theory, he could perfectly infer the true state of the world by observing the difference of
investment behavior (conditional on price) of high endowment and low endowment traders
as the number of traders becomes large, because investments from high endowment traders
are more likely to be correct. However, analyzing investment behavior of traders, Rothschild
and Sethi (2013) note that motives other than maximizing financial returns may play a role
in practice. Hence, inferring information in favor of A from a large investment in A may
not be valid. For example, Rothschild and Sethi (2013) speculate that large investments in
the Romney contract in the 2012 US presidential election may have been a manipulation
attempt to keep the price from plummeting. This is likely not a large concern for accuracy,
otherwise predictions would not be as accurate as we observe. Nevertheless, there is more
to a prediction market price than the mean belief of traders.
4 Conclusion and future research
Costly information acquisition explains the existence of uninformed traders, who do not ac-
quire information and rely only on their opinion when investing, and of informed traders. In
my model, noise traders, whose existence is usually just assumed to avoid the implications
of no trade theorems, and informed traders evolve endogenously from an initial distribution
of opinions and endowment. Thus, good forecasts are not explained merely by the exis-
tence of insiders in the market (and bad ones by their absence). Rather, the information
acquisition explanation implies that accurate initial beliefs as well as large endowment—
improving incentives for information acquisition—can lead to good forecasts, but low stakes
and inaccurate beliefs may also lead to bad ones. It also implies that larger weight on bets
or votes of high endowment agents may improve information aggregation, at least as long
22
as pooling of information is difficult and other motives such as manipulation (Rothschild
and Sethi, 2013) play a minor role. Endogenous weighting has a bias reducing effect, unless
endowments and priors are negatively related.
There appears to be only one empirical paper that attempts to shed light on the role of
money as incentive in futures markets. Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) compare predictions of
a play money prediction market and a real stakes prediction market. They find no significant
difference in forecast accuracy, but stress that the play money market has stronger selection
of good forecasters, because large ‘play endowment’ can only be obtained with a record of
correct predictions. Moreover, the top traders could redeem play money for prizes, thus
providing different (rank order) incentives for information acquisition. A direct test of the
information acquisition explanation, e.g., by endowing traders with play money randomly
to rule out selection effects, is yet to be done.
An evolutionary explanation is not just compatible, indeed it complements the infor-
mation acquisition explanation. Successful investing increases endowment, which improves
incentives for information acquisition and thereby future success, along with weight in the
market. Recently, Blume and Easley (2006) asked whether agents with more accurate beliefs
survive over time in the market, whereas agents with inaccurate beliefs vanish. In an infinite
horizon consumption model, they show that risk averse agents in complete markets indeed
survive only if they have correct beliefs, given that someone else does. If no one has accurate
beliefs, then those with beliefs closest to the truth survive, assuming homogeneous discount
factors. However, their results may not be directly applicable to prediction markets. For
instance, they do not model entry of new traders. And if there is continuous entry of new,
biased traders, then the population will never be completely free of biased beliefs. Moreover,
selection with respect to beliefs is retroactive, i.e., survivors have had correct forecasts. Con-
sequently, selection need not guarantee accurate forecasts in the future if novel events come
up for prediction. A question for empirical research is whether there is a forecasting ability,
so that past accuracy is positively related to future accuracy, or whether selection just favors
those who “got lucky,” in which case there would be a regression-toward-the-mean effect.
Appendix A: Upper and lower threshold of incentive
compatible priors
The goal is to find tu, the upper threshold of prior belief qi, where information acquisition is
just incentive compatible. Note that, for large ωi, precision levels ν
∗
i may be greater 1 and
therefore violate the axioms of probability. Moreover, for large ωi, there is no type qi ∈ [0, 1]
for which no information acquisition is preferable (i.e., there is no real solution for ql, qu
below). This requires case distinctions. Ignoring constraints, the type that is indifferent
between information acquisition and relying on his prior knowledge is found by setting the
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square root term in (3) equal to zero, which gives qu, and including constraints we obtain
tu =
qu(pi) =
−y−
√
y2−4xz
2x
if ν∗(qu) ≤ νˆ, qu ≤ 1 and qu ∈ R,
q : ν(q) = νˆ ∧ q ≥ pi otherwise,
where x = (α − β)2, y = −2β2 − 8α − 8β + 2αβ, z = β2 + 8β. qu is the smaller of the two
solutions of the U-shaped quadratic equation. Only the case qi ≥ pi has to be considered
here, because at qi = pi information acquisition is always incentive compatible (Proposition
1), so the upper threshold must be larger than the price. For the lower threshold type ql,
the square root term in (4) is similarly set to zero, resulting in
tl =
ql(pi) =
−y+
√
y2−4xz
2x
= 1− qu(1− pi) if ν∗(ql) ≤ νˆ, ql ≥ 0 and ql ∈ R,
q : ν(q) = νˆ ∧ q ≤ pi otherwise,
where x = (α − β)2, y = −2β2 + 8α + 8β + 2αβ, z = β2 − 8β. This is the larger of the
two solutions to the U-shaped quadratic equation. The following properties of the threshold
functions are used in the proofs. With respect to the price,
∂qu
∂pi
> 0,
∂ql
∂pi
> 0, and
∂qu
∂pi
>
∂ql
∂pi
⇐⇒ pi < 1/2, ∂qu
∂pi
<
∂ql
∂pi
⇐⇒ pi > 1/2.
Using symmetry,
∂qu
∂pi
= (1− ql(1− pi))′ = q′l(1− pi) = q′u(pi), q′l(1/2) = q′u(1/2).
Moreover,
∂qu
∂ω
> 0,
∂ql
∂ω
< 0, and
∂qu
∂ω
> −∂ql
∂ω
⇐⇒ pi < 1/2, ∂qu
∂ω
< −∂ql
∂ω
⇐⇒ pi > 1/2.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proposition 1.
i. Incentive compatible precision levels always discriminate, i.e., ν(qi, ωi, pi) ∈ R =⇒
ν(qi, ωi, pi) ≥ ν˜(qi, pi).
ii. The incentive compatibility constraint to acquire information becomes less stringent as
|qi − pi| decreases. If qi ≤ pi ≤ 1/2 or 1/2 ≤ pi ≤ qi, then ∂νi∂|qi−pi| ≤ 0. Moreover, if
prior beliefs in the economy are distributed according to a density q with full support on
[0, 1], then there exists a positive probability mass of traders with prior qi around pi who
acquire information.
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iii. The incentive compatibility constraint becomes less stringent as ωi increases for suffi-
ciently large ωi. If, for some ωi > 0, informative signals are acquired, then larger ωi
strictly increases signal precision until νi = νˆ. (
∂νi
∂ωi
≥ 0)
Proof. i. Setting qi = pi, both ν and ν˜ take value 1/2, the global minimum. The former
increases faster as qi deviates, hence the result follows.
ii. From i., νi ≥ ν˜ for qi close to pi for any ωi > 0. Since νi(pi = 1/2) = 1/2 and νi(pi)
is continuous with finite slope, there exists a neighborhood around qi = pi such that
νi < νˆ whenever νˆ > 1/2.
Setting qi = pi, νi − νi =
√
ωi/2 > 0. Since νi, νi are continuous in qi, there exists a
neighborhood around qi = pi such that [νi, νi]∩ [ν˜i, νˆ] 6= ∅. Because the density of qi is
strictly positive everywhere, there is a positive probability mass of traders with qi such
that information acquisition is incentive compatible.
The term within the square root of (3) or (4) is strictly decreasing in qi if qi > pi and
strictly increasing if qi < pi. If the term is negative, then information acquisition is
not incentive compatible. Thus, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes less
stringent as qi approaches pi.
Because ν∗i is increasing in qi whenever pi < 1/2 and decreasing whenever pi > 1/2, the
chosen precision is increasing in qi for qi ≤ pi ≤ 1/2 and decreasing for 1/2 ≤ pi ≤ qi.
Together with the effect on the stringency of the IC, ∂νi
∂|qi−pi| ≤ 0 if 1/2 ≤ pi ≤ qi or
qi ≤ pi ≤ 1/2.
iii. I first show that the range of incentive compatible effort levels is nondecreasing for
sufficiently large ωi > 0. Incentive compatible positive effort levels exist iff the term
within the square root in (3) or (4) is nonnegative. This term becomes positive for
sufficiently large ωi, because all squared ωi terms have positive sign, while one (linear)
ωi term has a negative sign.
To be shown: choice set [νi, νi] ∩ [ν˜i, νˆ] is nondecreasing and non-empty as ωi → ∞.
Since i. states ν˜i ≤ ν, it remains to be shown that sufficiently large ωi implies νi < νˆ.
Claim: limω→∞ νi → ν˜. To see this,5 apply a Taylor approximation for νi (see (3), (4)),
which is of the form y −√y2 − z ≈ z/(2y) and holds for y >> z. Then, as ωi →∞,
z
2y
=
1 + qiωi/pi
ωi[qi/pi + (1− qi)/(1− pi)] + 4 →
qi/pi
qi/pi + (1− qi)/(1− pi) = ν˜i.
The above approximation is obtained by Taylor expanding
√
1− x at 1, √1− x ≈
1 − 1/2x (omitting higher order terms, as these vanish asymptotically for x small).
5I am grateful to Ron Gordon for this idea.
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Then, using x = z/y2,
y −
√
y2 − z = y − y
√
1− z/y2 ≈ y − y
(
1− z
2y2
)
=
z
2y
.
The Taylor approximation becomes arbitrarily accurate as ωi →∞, since 1−z/y2 → 1.
It is easy to verify that νi converges from above. Therefore, the range of incentive
compatible effort levels is nondecreasing for sufficiently large ωi, so the choice set does
not decrease. Consequently, νi increases as ωi increases until νi = νˆ, because ν
∗
i is
strictly increasing in ωi.
Proposition 2.
i. There exists an equilibrium price pi∗ fulfilling definition 1,
ii. which is implicitly defined as the fixed point of (5).
iii. Assuming homogeneous endowment (ωi = ω), the equilibrium is unique for ω such that
νˆ is binding,
iv. and unique for ω such that νˆ is non-binding if ω is small.
Proof. i. The maximization problem for each i is continuous, with maximizer ai, bi from
the compact set ωi ≥ ai+bi ≥ 0. Applying Berge’s maximum theorem, the demand cor-
respondence is upper hemi-continuous (uhc) in the parameters, non-empty and compact-
valued. This implies that aggregate demand is uhc in the parameters (Aumann, 1976).
Given risk-neutrality, demand is multi-valued if and only if pi = pi. In this case, demand
is the budget line, which is a convex set. Writing (5) as mapping [0, 1]→ [0, 1],∫ ω
0
(
1−Q(tu) +
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗(qi, pi), νˆ}dQ(qi)
)
ωidW (ωi)/
∫ ω
0
ωidW (ωi) = pi,
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem guarantees the existence of pi fulfilling definition 1.
ii. In equilibrium, the number of contracts demanded for either outcome must be identical,
so that investments from the losers are identical to earnings of the winners. Without
loss of generality, suppose θ = 1. Then, denoting the mass of categorical traders buying
A-contracts at price pi∗ by CA and the mass of discriminatory A traders by DA (similarly
for B), the equilibrium price fulfills∫ ω
0
ωi
CA +DA
pi∗
dW (ωi) =
∫ ω
0
ωi
CB +DB
1− pi∗ dW (ωi)
⇐⇒
∫ ω
0
ωi(CA +DA)(1− pi∗)− ωi(CB +DB)pi∗dW (ωi) = 0
⇐⇒
∫ ω
0
ωi(CA +DA − pi∗)dW (ωi) = 0,
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because CA + CB + DA + DB = 1, and because risk neutral agents invest the entire
endowment ωi. Replacing the CA, DA terms, this is the desired expression.
iii. Rewriting,
∫ tu(pi)
tl(pi)
min{ν∗, νˆ}dQ = νˆ[Q(tu) − Q(tl)], since νˆ is binding. A change in pi
changes this term by νˆ[t′uq(tu) − t′lq(tl)], and changes 1 − Q(tu) by −t′uq(tu). Hence,
νˆ[t′uq(tu)− t′lq(tl)]− t′uq(tu) < 0, since νˆ ≤ 1 and t′u, t′l > 0. Thus, the probability mass
investing in A is strictly decreasing in pi, so there is a unique pi∗ fulfilling equality (5).
iv. For ω with non-binding ν∗i =
qiω
8pi
+ (1−qi)ω
8(1−pi) + 1/2, the precision has to be constrained for
pi → 1 and pi → 0 nonetheless. Thus
∂α/8
∂pi
=
− ω8pi2 if ν∗i < νˆ0 if ν∗i ≥ νˆ. ,
∂β/8
∂pi
=
 ω8(1−pi)2 if ν∗i < νˆ0 if ν∗i ≥ νˆ.
The demand for contract A (for the case θ = 1) is
1−Q(tu) +
∫ tu
tl
qiα + (1− qi)β + 4
8
dQ(qi) = 1−Q(tu) +
[
β
8
+
1
2
]
(Q(tu)−Q(tl))
+
α
8
[
tuQ(tu)− tlQ(tl)−
∫
Q(qi)dqi
]
− β
8
[
tuQ(tu)− tlQ(tl)−
∫
Q(qi)dqi
]
using integration by parts. Differentiating with respect to pi using Leibniz’ integral rule
and simplifying,
∂
∂pi
=q(tu)t
′
u
[
−1
2
+ tu
α
8
+ (1− tu)β
8
]
+ q(tl)t
′
l
[
−1
2
− α
8
tl − (1− tl)β
8
]
+
∂β/8
∂pi
[
Q(tu)(1− tu)−Q(tl)(1− tl) +
∫
Q(qi)dqi
]
+
∂α/8
∂pi
[
tuQ(tu)− tlQ(tl)−
∫
Q(qi)dqi
]
.
(7)
Now, −1
2
+ tu
α
8
+ (1 − tu)β8 ≤ 0, since 12 ≤ ν∗ = qiα+(1−qi)β+48 ≤ νˆ ≤ 1 ∀qi ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, the first two terms are negative (t′u, t
′
l > 0). The remaining two terms
have a positive upper bound of −∂α/8
∂pi
+ 2∂β/8
∂pi
, because 0 ≤ ∫ tu
tl
Q(qi)dqi ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ Q(tu) − Q(tl) ≤ 1. This upper bound can be decreased arbitrarily by reducing ω.
For ω → 0, the entire expression converges to −1/2(q(tu)t′u + q(tl)t′l) < 0, so demand is
decreasing in response to a decreasing pi for small ω, and uniqueness follows.
Proposition 3. Comparative statics if demand is non-increasing in the price, ω is homo-
geneous and θ = 1.
i. Any change in the prior distribution from Q to R such that Q(qi) > R(qi) ∀qi ∈ (0, 1)
increases the market price pi∗ if νˆ is binding, unless all agents in the Q-economy already
acquire information.
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ii. With priors qi ∼ N (µ, σ2) and ω < (1 − pi∗)4, an upward shift of µ increases the
equilibrium price pi∗ for each µ, σ if pi∗ ≤ 1/2.
iii. With priors qi ∼ N (µ, σ2) and endowment ω < (1− pi∗)4 sufficiently small, an upward
shift of µ increases the equilibrium price pi∗ for each µ, σ and pi∗.
iv. With priors from the triangular distribution, an increase in the mode value d leads to
an increase of the market prediction pi∗ if d < tl or d > tu.
v. Higher endowment increases information in the economy as measured by
DA =
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗(qi), νˆ}dQ(qi),
i.e., more traders obtain information of higher precision.
vi. For any distribution of priors with non-increasing density q the market prediction pi∗
increases in response to a non-binding endowment increase if pi∗ ≥ 1/2.
vii. With priors qi ∼ N (µ, σ2) the market prediction pi∗ increases in response to an endow-
ment increase for pi∗ ≥ 1/2, νˆ non-binding and |µ− tl| < |µ− tu|.
Proof. i. Not all agents acquire information, which implies tl ∈ (0, 1) or tu ∈ (0, 1). The
demand for the A-contract is 1−Q(tu)+
∫ tu
tl
νˆq(qi)dqi = 1−Q(tu)+ νˆ[Q(tu)−Q(tl)]. For
any change Q(qi) > R(qi) ∀qi ∈ (0, 1), the demand changes by Q(tu)−R(tu)+ νˆ[R(tu)−
Q(tu)− R(tl) +Q(tl)] > 0, since [1− νˆ]Q(tu) ≥ [1− νˆ]R(tu) and Q(tl) ≥ R(tl) with at
least one strict inequality, as tl or tu is in the interior. The increase of the equilibrium
price is implied by the implicit function theorem and non-increasing demand.
ii. Defining E(qi) ..=
∫ tu
tl
qiφ((qi − µ)/σ)/σdqi, the definition of the equilibrium price (5)
(assuming non-binding νˆ) with normally distributed priors is
1 + Φ
(
tu − µ
σ
)[
β
8
− 1
2
]
+ E(qi)
[
α
8
− β
8
]
+ Φ
(
tl − µ
σ
)[
−β
8
− 1
2
]
− pi∗ = 0.
By the implicit function theorem,
dpi∗
dµ
= − ∂(5)/∂µ
∂(5)/∂pi∗
= −
>0 since ω<(1−pi∗)4︷ ︸︸ ︷
− 1
σ
φ
(
tu − µ
σ
)
β − 4
8
≤0 if pi∗≥1/2︷ ︸︸ ︷
+E(qi)
′α− β
8
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
− 1
σ
φ
(
tl − µ
σ
) −β − 4
8
∂(5)/∂pi∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0.
(8)
The weight of the E(qi)
′ term can be scaled down arbitrarily by lowering ω, while the
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weight of the φ-terms in the numerator converge to 1/(2σ), showing iii. The E(qi)
′ term
is always non-positive for pi∗ ≤ 1/2, thus showing ii.
iii. Shown in ii.
iv. For case d < tl
CA +DA =
(1− tu)2
1− d +
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗, νˆ}2(1− qi)
(1− d) dqi > 0,
∂(CA +DA)
∂d
=
(1− tu)2
(1− d)2 +
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗, νˆ}2(1− qi)
(1− d)2 dqi > 0.
Consider next the case d ≥ tu
CA +DA = 1− t
2
u
d
+
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗, νˆ}2qi
d
dqi,
∂(CA +DA)
∂d
=
t2u
d2
−
∫ tu
tl
min{ν∗, νˆ}2qi
d2
dqi ≥ t
2
u
d2
− νˆ
[
t2u
d2
− t
2
l
d2
]
> 0,
because νˆ < 1. The comparative static is implied by non-increasing demand and the
implicit function theorem.
v. Using Leibniz’ integral rule,
∂DA
∂ω
=
∫ tu
tl
(
qi
8pi∗
+
(1− qi)
8(1− pi∗)
)
q(qi)dqi
+
tuα + (1− tu)β + 4
8
q(tu)t
′
u −
tlα + (1− tl)β + 4
8
q(tl)t
′
l > 0,
because ∂tl/∂ω < 0 and ∂tu/∂ω > 0.
vi. Using Leibniz’ integral rule,
∂(5)
∂ω
=
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ tu
tl
(
qi
8pi∗
+
(1− qi)
8(1− pi∗)
)
q(qi)dqi
+
tuα + (1− tu)β − 4
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0,>−1/2
q(tu)t
′
u −
tlα + (1− tl)β + 4
8︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1,>1/2
q(tl)t
′
l.
Since t′u > 0, t
′
l < 0, but t
′
u < −t′l ⇐⇒ pi∗ > 1/2 when νˆ is not binding, and since
density q is non-increasing, the expression is positive.
vii. Whenever µ is closer to tl than to tu, the former point has higher density by symmetry.
The rest follows from the proof of the previous result.
29
Lemma 4. If the economy consists of two groups with pi∗1 6= pi∗2, and demand is non-
increasing in the price for both groups, then the unique market price pi∗ fulfills min{pi∗1, pi∗2} <
pi∗ < max{pi∗1, pi∗2}.
Proof. If θ = 1, the equilibrium price is
γω1
[
1−Q1(tu(pi∗, ω1)) +
∫ tu(ω1)
tl(ω1)
min{ν∗(pi∗, ω1, qi), νˆ}dQ1(qi)− pi∗
]
+(1− γ)ω2
[
1−Q2(tu(pi∗, ω2)) +
∫ tu(ω2)
tl(ω2)
min{ν∗(pi∗, ω2, qi), νˆ}dQ2(qi)− pi∗
]
= 0.
(9)
Suppose without loss of generality pi∗1 > pi
∗
2. By monotonicity of demand, the LHS when
evaluated at pi = pi∗2 is positive and therefore cannot be a market clearing price. Since
demand for the A-contract is weakly decreasing in pi in both groups, the LHS is strictly
decreasing in pi. Thus, the unique market clearing price must fulfill pi∗ > pi∗2. Similarly, the
LHS evaluated at pi = pi∗1 is positive, which implies pi
∗ < pi∗1.
Proposition 6. Suppose the economy consists of two endowment groups ω1 > ω2, and
demand is non-increasing in the price for both groups. If pi∗1 > pi
∗
2, then pi
∗ > I∗. Similarly,
pi∗1 < pi
∗
2 implies pi
∗ < I∗.
Proof. For θ = 1, I∗ is defined as
γ
[
1−Q1(tu(I∗, ω1)) +
∫ tu(I∗,ω1)
tl(I∗,ω1)
min{ν∗(I∗, ω1, qi), νˆ}dQ1(qi)− I∗
]
+(1− γ)
[
1−Q2(tu(I∗, ω2)) +
∫ tu(I∗,ω2)
tl(I∗,ω2)
min{ν∗(I∗, ω2, qi), νˆ}dQ2(qi)− I∗
]
= 0.
Setting the price equal to pi∗, which fulfills pi∗1 > pi
∗ > pi∗2 (Lemma 4), the first term within
brackets is positive, while the second is negative. Since the relative weight of the first term is
reduced compared to (9), because ω1 > ω2, while the relative weight of the second is larger,
the LHS is negative. Consequently, the unique solution I∗ must be smaller than pi∗.
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